Standard common causal explanations of the EPR situation assume a so-called joint common cause system that is a common cause for all correlations. However, the assumption of a joint common cause system together with some other physically motivated assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy results in various Bell inequalities. Since Bell inequalities are violated for appropriate measurement settings, a local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of the EPR situation is ruled out. But why do we assume that a common causal explanation of a set of correlation consists in nding a joint common cause system for all correlations and not just in nding separate common cause systems for the dierent correlations? What are the perspectives of a local, non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation for the EPR scenario? And nally, how do Bell inequalities relate to the weaker assumption of separate common cause systems?
Introduction
In the history of probabilistic causation Reichenbach's denition (Reichenbach, 1956 ) was the rst formal grasp of the notion of common cause. The conceptual novelty of the Reichenbachian denition has attracted immense interest among philosophers of science from the very beginning (Salmon, 1975; van Fraassen, 1982) . From the physical side, the need for a common causal explanation of the EPR situation called attention to the denition of the common cause, even though in standard hidden variable strategies a slightly dierent common causal concept than the Reichenbachian has been applied (Bell, 1971; Jarrett, 1984; van Fraassen 1989 ). An important step in the conceptual clarication of the common cause in the EPR-Bell situation was the paper of Belnap and Szabó (1996) in which the dierence between the so-called joint and separate common cause had been rst recognized. Belnap and Szabó pointed out that in standard common causal explanations of the EPR correlations common cause is actually meant as a joint common cause accounting for all correlations.
Concerning the algebraic-probabilistic features of the Reichenbachian common cause Hofer- Szabó, Rédei and Szabó (1999) proved the following proposition. Classical (and also non-classical) correlations can be given a probabilistic common causal explanation in the sense that any classical probability measure space with correlating pairs of events can be extended such that the extension contains a Reichenbachian separate common cause for each correlation. (For the precise denitions see below.) Then in (Hofer-Szabó, Rédei, Szabó, 2002) it was proven that this proposition does not apply if Reichenbachian separate common causes are replaced with Reichenbachian joint common causes. In other words, classical probability measure spaces containing correlating pairs of events generally cannot be extended such that the extension contains a Reichenbachian joint common cause for all correlations. Thus, being a joint common cause of a set of correlations turned out to be a much stronger demand than being a common cause of a single correlation.
The rst to apply the concept of separate common cause to the EPR situation was Szabó (2000) .
Since factorizability, locality and no-conspiracy together entail various types of Bell inequalities, EPR
correlations cannot be given a local, non-conspiratorial, joint common causal model. Now, Szabó's idea was to replace the joint common causes with separate common causes and thus to give a separate common causal model for the EPR correlations. He constructed a number of separate common causal models which were local and non-conspiratorial in the usual sense that the measurement settings were statistically independent of the dierent common causes. However, the models were conspiratorial on a deeper level. The measurement settings statistically correlated with various algebraic combinations of the separate common causes. This fact called attention to the subtle but important dierence between the so-called weak no-conspiracy where statistically independence is required only from the measure settings and the common causes themselves, and strong no-conspiracy where statistically independence is required from any Boolean combination of the measure settings and any Boolean combination of the common causes. After numerous computer simulations aiming to remove the unwanted conspiracies Szabó concluded with the conjecture that EPR cannot be given a local, strongly non-conspiratorial, separate common causal model.
The conjecture of Szabó has been rst proven by Grassho, Portmann and Wüthrich (2005) .
The proof consisted in deriving some Bell inequality from the same assumptions that Szabó intended to apply in his separate common causal models for the EPR correlations. A crucial premise of this derivation was that the (anti)correlation between some events be perfect. Assuming perfect anticorrelations, however, turned the separate common causal explanations into a joint common causal explanation. This fact has been shown in (Hofer-Szabó, 2008 ). In the same paper HoferSzabó eliminated the assumption of perfect anticorrelations and presented a separate common causal derivation of some Bell-like inequalities (Bell(δ) Let us start the common causal explanation with Reichenbach's (1956) denition of the common cause. Let (Σ, p) be a classical probability measure space and let A, B ∈ Σ be two positively correlating events, i.e.
Reichenbach then denes the common cause of the correlation as follows:
Denition 1. An event C ∈ Σ is said to be the Reichenbachian common cause of the correlation between A and B, if the events A, B and C satisfy the following relations:
where C denotes the complement of C and the conditional probability is dened in the usual way.
Equations (2)- (3) are referred to as screening-o properties and inequalities (4)- (5) as positive statistical relevance conditions. (Here we do not discuss the problem as to whether conditions (2)-(5) are necessary or sucient conditions for an event C to be a common cause and simply take them to be the denition of the common cause.)
Physicists use the notion of 'common cause' in a dierent meaning. We obtain this meaning if (i)
we drop the positive statistical relevance conditions (4)-(5) from the denition, and (ii) we do not restrict the screening-o properties (2)-(3) to the partition {C, C} of Σ:
Denition 2. Let (Σ, p) be a classical probability measure space and let (A, B) be a correlating pair of events in Σ. A partition {C k } (k ∈ K) of Σ is said to be the common cause system of the pair (A, B) if for all k ∈ K the following conditions are satised:
The cardinality |K| (the number of events in the partition) is called the size of the common cause system. We will refer to a common cause system of size 2 (that is of the form {C, C}) as a common cause. (Sometimes we will also refer to C as a common cause.)
Now, let (Σ, p) be a classical probability measure space as before and let (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ), respectively be two positively correlating pairs of events in Σ, i.e. for i = 1, 2
In order to give a common causal explanation for both correlating pairs we have two options. Either we assume that the two correlations arise from the same causal source or we attribute dierent causal sources to the correlations. In the rst case we explain the correlation by a so-called joint common cause system, in the second case we employ two separate common cause systems. The denition of joint and separate common cause systems, respectively are the following:
of Σ is said to be the joint common cause system of correlations (A i , B i ) (i = 1, 2), respectively if for i = 1, 2 and k ∈ K the following relations are satised:
) of Σ are said to be separate common cause systems of the correlations (A i , B i ) (i = 1, 2), respectively if for i = 1, 2 and k(i) ∈ K(i) the following relations hold:
Having dened dierent common causal structures let us turn to the procedure of causal explanation. A common causal explanation of a given correlation is realized mathematically by the extension of the probabilistic measure space in such a way that for the original correlation there exists a common cause system in the extended probabilistic measure space. In the case of two (or more) correlations we can extend the algebra in two dierent ways according to our causal intuition.
In order to model a joint common causal source of the correlations we extend the algebra such that in the extended algebra all correlations have a joint common cause system. On the other hand to account for separate causal mechanisms we extend the algebra such that in the extended algebra dierent correlations have separate common cause systems.
The extendability of the probabilistic measure spaces by joint respectively separate common causal structures crucially depends on the size of the common cause system. In the case of a common cause system of size 2 that is in the case of a common cause there is a great dierence between joint and separate common cause extensions as it is shown in the following two propositions: Proposition 1. (Hofer-Szabó, Rédei, Szabó, 1999) Let (Σ, p) be a classical probability measure space and let (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ), respectively be two correlating pairs of events in Σ. Then there always exists a (Σ , p ) extension of (Σ, p) such that for the correlation (A 1 , B 1 ) there exists a common cause C 1 and for the correlation (A 2 , B 2 ) there exists a common cause C 2 in (Σ , p ).
Proposition 2. (Hofer-Szabó, Rédei, Szabó, 2002) There exists a (Σ, p) classical probability measure space and two correlating pairs (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ), respectively in Σ such that there is no (Σ , p ) extension of (Σ, p) which contains a joint common cause C in (Σ , p ) for both correlations.
Proposition 1 claims that for two correlating pairs a separate common causal explanation is always possible by extending the probability measure space in an appropriate way. (Moreover, if Σ contains n ∈ N correlating pairs, each correlation can be given a separate common causal explanation.)
However, according to Proposition 2 this strategy does not work generally if we are going to obtain the same common cause for the two (or more) correlating pairs. Thus, being a joint common cause imposes much stronger demand on C than simply being a separate common cause.
However, strangely enough this dierence between the common and separate common causal extendability of a probability measure space disappears if the size of the common cause system is not specied. In other words, to nd a joint common cause system of arbitrary size for a set of correlations is not a stronger demand than to nd separate common cause systems for the same set.
To see this, let (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) be two arbitrary correlating pairs in Σ. Then the partition
is always a joint common cause system in Σ for both correlations. Obviously, this partition can be regarded only as a trivial joint common cause system of the correlations. This makes it clear that without further specication a joint common causal explanation is not more compelling than a separate common causal explanation. In the following sections we will see how these two types of explanations diverge due to extra requirements.
3
No local, non-conspiratorial joint common cause system for the EPR Consider the standard EPR-Bohm experimental setup with a source emitting pairs of spin-1 2 particles prepared in the singlet state |Ψ s . Let p(a i ) denote the probability that the spin measurement apparatus is set to measure the spin in direction a i (i ∈ I) in the left wing and let p(b j ) denote the same for direction b j (j ∈ J) in the right wing. Furthermore, let p(A i ) stand for the probability that the spin measurement in direction a i in the left wing yields the result +1 ('up') and let p(A i ) denote the probability of the result −1 ('down'). Let p(B j ) and p(B j ) be dened in a similar way in the right wing for direction b j . (See Fig. 1 ) Quantum mechanics then yields the following conditional probabilities for the events in question:
where W |Ψs is the density operator pertaining to the pure state |Ψ s ; P Ai and P Bj denote projections on the eigensubspaces with eigenvalue +1 of the spin operators associated with directions a i and b j , respectively; and θ aibj denotes the angle between directions a i and b j . Thus, for non-perpendicular directions a i and b j there is a conditional correlation
and for parallel directions there is a perfect anticorrelation between the outcomes:
Now, consider a set {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J of EPR correlations in the sense of (13). A full-edged common causal explanation of the set {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J must comply with three demands on the statistical level. Firstly, all the correlations must be screened-o by a joint common cause system. Secondly, statistical relations among the measurement outcomes and the measurement settings must reect the spacetime location of these events in the sense that spatially separated events have to be statistically independent. Thirdly, the measurement settings and the common cause should not inuence each other, they have to be statistically independent. We refer to these requirements in turn as 'joint common cause system', 'locality' and 'no-conspiracy'. In the case of 'no-conspiracy' we will distinguish two types: the 'weak' and the 'strong no-conspiracy'. The precise probabilistic formulation of these demands is the following:
1. Joint common cause system: There exists a partition {C k } of Σ such that for every A i , B j , a i and b j in Σ (i ∈ I, j ∈ J) and for any k ∈ K the following factorization holds:
2. Locality: For every A i , B j , a i , b j and C k in Σ (i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K) the following screening-o relations hold:
3. a. Weak no-conspiracy: For every a i , b j and C k in Σ (i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K) the following independence holds:
b. Strong no-conspiracy: Consider two Boolean subalgebras A and C of Σ such that A is generated by the partition of the dierent measurement choices {a i b j } (i ∈ I, j ∈ J) on the opposite wings, and C is generated by the partition of the common cause system {C k } (k ∈ K). Then for any element E ∈ A and F ∈ C the following independence holds:
It is straightforward to see that in the case of joint common cause systems (17) and (18) are equivalent, the probabilistic independence of the Boolean combinations of common causes and the measurement settings does not demand more than simply the probabilistic independence of the common causes and the measurement settings themselves. Thus, in the case of the joint common cause system type explanations equation (17) will suce as a no-conspiracy requirement.
However, as it is well-known (15)- (17) Proposition 3. (Clauser, Horne, 1974) For some measurement directions a 1 , a 2 and b 3 , b 4 there cannot exist extension of the probability space (Σ, p) such that the extension contains local, (weakly or strongly) non-conspiratorial joint common cause systems for all EPR correlations of {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈CH .
Consequently, EPR correlations fall short of a local, non-conspiratorial, joint common cause system type explanation. One premise has to be given up.
4
Local, weakly non-conspiratorial separate common cause systems do exist for the EPR Strategies aiming to avoid Bell inequalities and to give a common causal explanation for the EPR correlations can be grouped according the abandoned premise. The rst group consists of approaches abandoning locality and preserving the joint common causal background and no-conspiracy. Bohmian mechanics is an eminent representative of this group. The second group consists of less attractive models in which no-conspiracy is given up. Examples of this approach are Brans' and Szabó's models (Brans, 1988; Szabó, 1995) . In these models the authors relinquished no-conspiracy and provided a local, deterministic but conspiratorial joint common cause system type explanation for the EPR.
(For the problem of free will and no-conspiracy see (SanPedro, 2013.) In this paper, however, we will follow a third strategy which gives up the hypothesis of a joint common cause system. The key idea here is to replace the concept of joint common cause system with that of separate common cause systems and to provide a local, non-conspiratorial, separate common cause system type explanation for the EPR. A separate common cause system type explanation for a set {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J consists in nding for every (i, j) ∈ I × J index pair a separate partition {C ij k } (k(ij) ∈ K(ij)) such that screening-o, locality, and (weak or strong) no-conspiracies holds in the following sense:
1. Separate common cause systems: For every A i , B j , a i and b j in Σ (i ∈ I, j ∈ J) there exists a separate partition C ij k of Σ such that for any k(ij) ∈ K(ij) the following factorization holds:
2. Locality: For every i ∈ I, j ∈ J and k(ij) ∈ K(ij) the following screening-o relations hold:
3. a. Weak no-conspiracy: For every a i , b j and
the following independence holds:
b. Strong no-conspiracy: Consider again two Boolean subalgebras A and C of Σ such that A is generated by the partition of the dierent measurement choices {a i b j } (i ∈ I, j ∈ J) and C is generated by the partition of all the dierent common cause systems ∩ ij C ij k (k ∈ K). Then for any element E ∈ A and F ∈ C the following independence holds:
Here, requirement (21) does not entail (22), that is the independence of the separate common cause systems of the choice of the measurement settings does not assure that any Boolean combination of the common causes will also be independent of any Boolean combination of the measurement settings. Thus, in the case of separate common cause system type explanations one has to take into consideration two dierent versions of no-conspiracy.
The idea to replace the concept of a joint common cause system with that of separate common cause systems and to provide a local, non-conspiratorial separate common cause system type explanation for the EPR was rst raised by Szabó (2000) . Actually, Szabó replaced the joint common cause system with separate common cause systems of size 2 that is with separate common causes. Szabó provided a number of separate common causal models for the ClauserHorne set {(
such that the models were local and non-conspiratorial in the weak sense of (22). In a precise form, Szabó's proposition was the following:
Proposition 4. (Szabó, 2000) Let {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈CH be the ClauserHorne set of correlations in (Σ, p). Then for any measurement directions a 1 , a 2 and b 3 , b 4 there exists an extension of the probability space (Σ, p) such that the extension contains local, weakly non-conspiratorial separate common causes for the correlations of {(
The common causal models provided by Szabó, however, were all conspiratorial in the strong sense of (22). After numerous computer simulations aiming to remove the unwanted conspiracies Szabó nally concluded with the conjecture that EPR cannot be given any local, separate common causal model free from all type of conspiracies. Proposition 5. For some measurement directions { a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 and b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 there cannot exist extension of the probability space (Σ, p) such that the extension contains local, strongly nonconspiratorial separate common cause systems for all EPR correlations of {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈P A .
The above proposition was rst proved by Grassho, Portmann and Wüthrich (2005) . They have shown that no local, strongly non-conspiratorial separate common cause systems are possible for all correlations of {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈P A , if for any index pair (i, j) ∈ P A there is a perfect anticorrelation (hence the denotation 'P A') in the sense of (14).
The assumption of perfect anticorrelations, however, was unsatisfactory in two respects. The rst problem concerns experimental testability. Since perfect anticorrelations cannot be tested experimentally with absolute precision, the proof of Grassho, Portmann and Wüthrich did not provide an experimentally veriable refutation of a separate common causal explanation of the EPR.
The second problem was more conceptual. Standard derivations of the Bell inequalities assume a joint common cause system. The chief virtue of the proof of Grassho, Portmann and Wüthrich was that it avoided this strong concept of a joint common cause system and used the weaker concept of separate common cause systems instead. However, in the perfect anticorrelation case the assumptions of separate common cause systems turned out to be reducible to the assumptions of the standard joint common cause system as it was shown in the following proposition:
be local, strongly non-conspiratorial separate common cause systems for the correlations of {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈P A . Then the partition {D l } := ∩ ij C ij k generated by the intersections of the dierent separate common cause systems is a local, non-conspiratorial joint common cause system of the same correlations of {(
The assumption of perfect anticorrelations, however, turned out not to be indispensable in the proof of Proposition 5. Portmann and Wüthrich (2007) and Hofer-Szabó (2008) have shown that Proposition 5 also holds if one only assumes that the correlations to be explained form an almost perfect anticorrelation set, {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈P A(δ) , in the sense that there exists a δ of some small but not zero value such that
for any index pair (i, j) ∈ P A(δ).
Finally, Hofer-Szabó (2011 , 2012 generalized this proof by deriving arbitrary Bell(δ) inequality that is to say, an inequality diering from the corresponding Bell inequality in a term of order δ. The recipe of this derivation is roughly the following. Consider a Bell inequality resulting from the local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of a given set of correlations {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J (not necessarily {(A i , B j )} CH ). Now, dene the set P A for {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J as follows: let P A contain all the index pairs (k, k) in (I ∪ J) × (I ∪ J) that is all indices appearing either on the left or the right hand side of the correlations in {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈I×J . Now consider the set {(A i , B j )} P A(δ) of almost perfect anticorrelations and suppose that it has a local, strongly non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation. This assumption results in a Bell(δ) inequality diering from the original Bell inequality in a term of order of δ where the exact magnitude of this term is the function of the approximation. Choose the setting which violates the Bell inequality maximally. If the δ term is smaller than the violation of the original Bell inequality, then the Bell(δ) inequality will also be violated, excluding a local, strongly nonconspiratorial separate common causal explanation of the set {(A i , B j )} P A(δ) .
Conclusions
In the paper, rst, dierent common causal concepts ranging from Reichenbach's denition to the most general concept of the common cause system have been listed. Then the role of the dierent causal notions in the common causal explanation of the EPR scenario has been exposed. It was said that a completely satisfactory common causal explanations of the EPR would consist in nding a joint common causal source for all correlations which is local and non-conspiratorial. Since these assumptions together entail various Bell inequalities one assumption has to be abandoned. The ambition of the separate common cause system type approach of the EPR was to preserve the latter two physically motivated assumptions of locality and no-conspiracy at the expense of replacing the strong concept of the joint common cause system with the weaker concept of separate common cause systems. It has been shown, however, that the weakening of the common causal concept does not provide a solution to this problem since the weakened assumptions still entail some Bell and Bell(δ) inequalities. Consequently, there exists neither a local, (weakly or strongly) non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation of the EPR. A weakness of all the above no-go theorems, however, is that they are all based on either perfect or almost perfect EPR correlations. As it was made clear in Proposition 6 the separate common causal explanation of such correlations is always parasitic on some joint common causal explanation.
Therefore it would be highly desirable to derive some Bell inequality form a local, strongly nonconspiratorial separate common causal explanation of a set of genuine (not almost perfect) EPR correlations. For example it would be widely wanted to prove or falsify Szabó's original conjecture (Conjecture 1)that is for the set {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈CH violating the ClauserHorne inequality (i) either to derive the ClauserHorne inequality (or some other constraint) from the assumption that {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈CH has a local, strongly non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation;
(ii) or to show up local, strongly non-conspiratorial separate common cause systems for the set {(A i , B j )} (i,j)∈CH .
Neither option seems to be a trivial task.
